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The United States consumes 8.5 million
barrels of gasoline daily—nearly half its daily
consumption of all petroleum products. The
average automobile tank is filled weekly, and
gasoline prices are posted at every street corner
where there is a gasoline station. Consequently,
most U.S. consumers are very aware of move-
ments in gasoline prices and closely observe 
the asymmetry when crude oil and gasoline
prices fluctuate. Many consumers complain that
gasoline prices rise more quickly when crude
oil prices are rising than they fall when crude 
oil prices are falling, exhibiting an asymmetric
relationship.
1 To the naked eye, movements 
in spot crude oil and retail gasoline prices 
may lend some credence to consumers’ com-
plaints (Figure 1).
Furthermore, in some instances when
gasoline prices have risen sharply and swiftly
following a rise in crude oil prices—such as
occurred in 1999 and 2000 and during the Gulf
War in 1990—consumers and politicians have
called for policies to put a stop to what is seen as
unfair pricing practices for petroleum products.
2
Such reactions seem to stem from a popular sus-
picion that large, integrated companies have
monopolized the oil industry. The public seems
to take the asymmetric relationship between
gasoline and crude oil prices as evidence that
the petroleum industry is monopolistic.
Most of the previous research on the sub-
ject confirms at least part of what consumers
suspect: it provides econometric evidence of an
asymmetric relationship between gasoline and
crude oil prices. This article extends inquiry into
the issue by considering competing explana-
tions for the asymmetry. The available evidence
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suggests that asymmetry is unlikely to be the
result of monopoly power exercised by large,
integrated oil companies. An examination of 
the possible explanations for the asymmetry
also suggests that government intervention to
prevent the asymmetry between gasoline and
crude oil prices is likely to reduce economic
efficiency.
THE EVIDENCE FOR ASYMMETRY
Most of the previous research provides
econometric support for public claims that gaso-
line prices rise more quickly when crude oil
prices are rising than they fall when crude
prices are falling. Bacon (1991) finds asymmetry
for the UK gasoline market. Karrenbock (1991);
French (1991); Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert
(1997); Balke, Brown, and Yücel (1998); and a
GAO report (1993) all find some evidence for an
asymmetric response in U.S. gasoline markets.
3
In contrast with the other studies, Norman and
Shin (1991) find a symmetric response in U.S.
gasoline markets.
Of these studies, one of the most visible
and comprehensive is that of Borenstein,
Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), hereafter identified
as BCG. They use weekly and biweekly data
from 1986 to 1992 in a series of bivariate error-
correction models to test for asymmetry in price
movements between gasoline’s various stages 
of production and distribution—from crude oil
through the refinery to the retail pump. They
find strong and pervasive evidence of asym-
metry in all segments of the market.
Shin (1992) argues, however, that the
periodicity of the data, the sample period of
estimation, and the model specification may
affect the results obtained in various studies. To
examine the issues that Shin raises, Balke,
Brown, and Yücel (1998), hereafter identified as
BBY, extend the work of BCG by using several
different model specifications and various sub-
samples of weekly data from 1987 through early
1996. BBY confirm BCG’s supposition that most
of the price volatility originates upstream (in or
closer to markets for crude oil) rather than
downstream (in or closer to final consumer mar-
kets). They also find that asymmetry is sensitive
to model specification but not to sample period.
With their most preferred specification, how-
ever, BBY find evidence that asymmetry is per-
vasive across the stages of gasoline production
and distribution.
For example, BBY find retail gasoline
prices initially rise sharply after the crude oil
price rises and then increase more gradually, as
shown in Panel 1 of Figure 2. In contrast, retail
gasoline prices respond only gradually to a
falling crude oil price (Panel 2). The net effect
is an asymmetric response in gasoline prices
(Panel 3). Retail gasoline prices respond more
quickly when crude oil prices are rising than
when they are falling. 
EXPLANATIONS OF ASYMMETRY
With a number of studies showing that
gasoline prices respond more quickly when
crude oil prices rise than when they fall, econo-
mists have offered numerous explanations for
the phenomenon.
4 Explanations include mar-
ket power, search costs, consumer response to
changing prices, inventory management, account-
ing practices, refinery adjustment costs, and the
behavior of markups over the business cycle.
For the gasoline markets, however, no one has
posited a formal econometric test that would
allow the testing of the various explanations—
including market power—for price asymmetry
against the available data. In the absence of
such tests, judgment and economic theory 
must be used to sort through the explanations
and determine whether the asymmetric response
of gasoline prices to movements in crude oil
prices is the result of market power or more
benign forces.
Market Power
Market power is probably the greatest
concern to those who observe that gasoline
prices respond more quickly when crude oil
prices rise than when they fall. For the banking
industry, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) show that
market concentration is an explanatory variable
for the asymmetry found in interest rate move-
ments. In a comprehensive study of U.S. indus-
try, however, Peltzman (2000) finds no evidence
that market power is related to price asymmetry.
In addition, neither we nor Peltzman could find
a theoretical model that relates market power to
an asymmetric response of downstream prices
to changes in upstream prices.
5 Were such a
model to exist, it might involve consumer search
costs or firms concerned with maintaining a tacit
collusion or both.
Consider an industry with a few dominant
firms that are engaged in an unspoken collusion
to maintain higher profit margins. Reputation
can be important to maintaining such a tacit
agreement (Tirole 1990). If the firms value the
agreement and have imperfect knowledge of
the upstream prices their competitors are pay-
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function where it would be more reluctant to
lower its selling price than to raise it. When
upstream prices rise, each firm is quick to raise
its selling price because it wants to signal its
competitors that it is adhering to the tacit agree-
ment by not cutting its margin. When the
upstream price falls, each firm is slow to lower
its selling price because doing so runs the risk
of sending a signal to its competitors that it is
cutting its margin and no longer adhering to the
tacit agreement. In the gasoline markets, such
an explanation could be applied to each up-
stream price and its adjacent downstream price.
Despite popular wisdom and an explana-
tion linking concentration to the asymmetry
between movements in crude oil and gasoline
prices, there does not appear to be much evi-
dence of monopolization in any segment of the
gasoline market. The United States consumed
123 billion gallons of gasoline in 1996. The mar-
ket share claimed by the four largest gasoline
refiner/marketers (37.7 percent), as well as a rela-
tively low Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of 650,
suggests that U.S. gasoline production is com-
petitive when viewed at the national level.
6
Because refined products are harder and
more expensive to ship than crude oil, however,
gasoline markets tend to be regionalized. In
addition, regional variation in the environmental
regulation of gasoline formulation may be in-
creasing the regionalization of gasoline markets.
Furthermore, changes in technology and envi-
ronmental regulation have caused some smaller
refiners to go out of business and increased the
market share of the remaining refiners—most
notably in California, where the clean air rules
are more stringent than the national average
and the number of refiners has decreased (from
31 in 1990 to 23 in 1996).
If gasoline markets were strictly regional,
the number of refiners serving a region would
be limited by the size of the regional market
and economies of scale. In those regions with a
few refiners, market power would be a possi-
bility. Nonetheless, gasoline shipments between
regions seem sufficient to establish workable
competition in most areas, and in most regions
of the country one can find a number of com-
peting brands of gasoline.
The case for market power also seems
difficult to make for the retail sector. In rural
areas and small towns, regional monopolies
could exist, and gasoline stations have often
been cited as examples of monopolistic compe-
tition. But, the sheer number of retail gasoline
stations makes complete monopolization un-
likely. The United States had 190,246 retail 
gasoline outlets in 1996. Of these, 114,452 were
branded outlets (that is, they sold brand-name
gasoline) belonging to 21 companies with at
least 1,000 outlets each. Citgo, a subsidiary of
the Venezuelan PDVSA, had the most retail out-
lets, with 14,529 in 48 states; Texaco came in
second with 13,785 outlets in 25 states. The top
six companies had 55 percent of the branded
market and 33 percent of the total retail market,
none of which provides strong evidence of 
Figure 2
Asymmetric Response of Retail Gasoline
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market concentration or market power. None-
theless, Borenstein and Shepard (1993) find some
evidence of coordinated pricing in a study using
data from 1986–91 for 59 U.S. cities.
Limited Market Power and Search Costs
In the retail gasoline market, consumer
search costs could lead to temporary market
power for gasoline stations and an asymmetric
response to changes in the wholesale price of
gasoline. (See BCG, Norman and Shin 1991,
Borenstein 1991, Deltas 1997, and Peltzman
2000.) Each gasoline station has a locational
monopoly that is limited by consumer search.
After consumers have searched, the profit mar-
gins at each gasoline station are pushed down
to a roughly competitive level. When wholesale
prices rise, the owner of each station acts to
maintain profit margins and quickly passes the
increase on to customers.
7 When wholesale
prices fall, however, each station temporarily
boosts its profit margins by slowly passing the
decrease on to customers. Only after the cus-
tomers engage in a costly and time-consuming
search to find the lowest prices are the stations
forced to lower prices to a competitive level.
A factor slowing the search process is that
the costs of an intensive search are likely to be
much higher for most consumers than the cor-
responding gains from finding a cheaper price
for gasoline. The money saved is a very small
part of the consumer’s budget, so that con-
sumers will not search unless the price differen-
tial is very high. How large is this differential for
the average consumer? The average passenger
car consumes 504 gallons of gasoline per year.
For a person filling up the tank every week, that
comes to 9.7 gallons per week. The price differ-
ential between gasoline stations is usually not
more than a couple of cents. If the difference were
10 cents (which is much higher than average), it
would amount to 97 cents per week, about the
price of a cup of coffee, which is likely to be
less than the value of the time used in an
aggressive search for lower-priced gasoline.
8
More Benign Explanations
Beyond market power and search costs,
economists have offered a number of explana-
tions for the asymmetric response of gasoline
prices to movements in crude oil prices. Alter-
native explanations include markups that vary
over the business cycle, consumer response to
changing prices, inventory management,
accounting practices, and refinery adjustment
costs. Other than the variation in markups over
the business cycle, none of the explanations can
be ruled out on either theoretical or empirical
grounds.
If markups vary over the business cycle,
the difference between the crude oil and retail
gasoline price could increase as overall prices
rise. Reagan (1982) and Reagan and Weitzman
(1982) offer a theoretical explanation for such 
a relationship based upon the variation in de-
mand over the business cycle. Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991) further suggest that the fluc-
tuations in margins may result from variations in
the degree of collusive behavior. However, BBY
find that the shocks to crude oil and gasoline
prices originate with supply rather than demand,
which renders the explanation inapplicable.
The consumer response to changing
gasoline prices may contribute to the asymmetry
between movements in crude oil and gasoline
prices at the retail level. If consumers accelerate
their gasoline purchases to beat further increases
when its price is rising, they will increase inven-
tories held in automobiles and quicken the pace
at which the price rises. If drivers fear running
out of gasoline and do not slow their purchases
when its price is falling by as much as they
accelerated their purchases when prices rose,
the price of gasoline will fall more slowly than
it rose.
Similarly, firms in the oil industry may
view the short-run costs of unexpected changes
in their inventories as asymmetric (see BCG). If
operation costs rise sharply when inventories
are reduced below normal operating levels, a re-
duction of upstream supply could lead a firm to
raise its output prices aggressively to prevent a
Components of the Retail Gasoline Price
The cost to produce and deliver
gasoline to consumers includes the cost 
of crude oil to refiners, refinery processing
costs, marketing and distribution costs, 
and retail station costs and taxes. In July
2000 crude oil costs made up 44 percent 
of the total cost of gasoline. Refining costs
and profits were 13 percent, and distribution,
marketing, and retail costs were 16 percent.
Federal and state taxes (not including
county and local taxes) were 27 percent of
the total price, on average. Both federal 
and state taxes have been increasing in the
past two decades. After staying constant at 
4 cents per gallon until 1983, federal taxes
rose gradually to 18.4 cents per gallon by
1994, where they have remained. State
taxes have increased steadily from the
1920s to the current rate of 19.96 cents.
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration,
Office of Oil and Gas, online publication
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loss of inventories. If an increase in inventories
above normal operating levels has a relatively
small effect on costs, the firm could be less
aggressive in reducing its selling prices when it
experiences an increase in upstream supply.
Hence, inventories would buffer downstream
price movements less when prices are rising
than when they are falling.
If oil supply shocks cause asymmetric
movements in inventories—with higher inven-
tories when oil supply is plentiful and lower
inventories when oil supply is reduced—the
asymmetry of price movements could be
enhanced by FIFO (first in, first out) accounting.
If inventories are lower when upstream supply
is reduced, the firm will sell the products incor-
porating the higher upstream price sooner. If
inventories are higher when upstream supply is
increased, the firm will sell the products incor-
porating the lower upstream price later. These
actions help foster asymmetric pricing.
Refiners also face adjustment costs to
changing their output or their product mix and,
consequently, adjust their output slowly when
possible. When crude oil supplies are reduced,
refiners as a group have little choice but to
reduce output quickly, which would lead to
fairly quick increases in gasoline prices. When
crude oil supplies are increased, however, re-
finers don’t necessarily have to increase output
quickly. They can increase output slowly and
delay the decreases in gasoline prices.
THE POLICY RESPONSE
If we adhere to the traditional view that
economic policy should be directed only at mar-
ket failures or imperfections, policy probably
should not be directed at eliminating the asym-
metry between crude oil and retail gasoline
prices. The evidence of monopolization in refin-
ing and wholesale markets for gasoline is weak
at best. Peltzman (2000) finds that asymmetry
itself is not indicative of a monopolized market.
Any market power that might exist at the retail
level appears to be related to the costs of prod-
uct differentiation—most likely in the form of
locational differences.
Furthermore, Peltzman finds that an asym-
metric relationship between an upstream and 
a downstream price is as likely in competitive
markets as in markets thought to be monopo-
lized. If competitive market forces and asym-
metry coexist, steps to suppress or eliminate the
asymmetry are likely to prove costly because
government interference in natural market proc-
esses typically reduces economic efficiency.
9
If the monopolization of gasoline markets is a
concern, policies will be more effective directed
at monopolization than at market phenomena
that can be the result of either competitive or
monopolized markets.
Refining and Wholesale Markets
Because there is little evidence of monop-
olization in the refinery and wholesale markets
for gasoline, the observed asymmetry between
wholesale gasoline and crude prices is most
likely the result of competitive market forces.
Calculations based on the BBY estimates also
suggest the degree of asymmetry of response in
wholesale gasoline prices to changes in crude
oil prices is quite small and of short duration.
Given a 1 percent increase and a 1 percent de-
crease in the crude oil price, the difference in
response of wholesale gasoline to these changes
is only 0.35 percent and persists only for two
weeks. The asymmetry of response in whole-
sale gasoline prices starts around the third week
and becomes insignificant around the fifth week.
If competitive market forces account for the
asymmetry between wholesale gasoline and
crude oil prices, any policies to eliminate it are
quite likely to involve higher costs than living
with the asymmetry.
Even if it is the result of market power,
the asymmetry is so fleeting that the likely costs
of the unintended consequences of a policy to
prevent price asymmetries probably would out-
weigh the benefits. If policymakers are con-
cerned about the monopolization of refinery or
wholesale markets for gasoline, the most pru-
dent policy is to watch for mergers that increase
market concentration without providing gains in
the economies of scale, rather than to take
direct steps to suppress asymmetry.
Retail Markets
Compared with the upstream markets,
price asymmetries in the retail market are longer
in duration and smaller in magnitude. Loca-
tional differentiation and consumer search costs
could contribute to market power, and Boren-
stein and Shepard (1993) find evidence of coordi-
nated pricing in the retail gasoline market. But,
asymmetric pricing can arise whether or not
there is market power. Consequently, the bene-
fits of policies to eliminate asymmetry in the
retail gasoline market are likely to be small,
while the costs could be high.
Calculations made with the BBY estimates
suggest that a 1 percent increase and a 1 per-
cent decrease in the price of oil lead to a peak
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of the retail gasoline price. To illustrate, sup-
pose the current prices for oil and gasoline are
$30 per barrel and $1.50 per gallon, respec-
tively. The peak difference in the response of
the retail gasoline price to a $6 increase and
decrease in the per barrel price of crude oil
would be only 6 cents per gallon.
10 For the aver-
age driver, this differential would amount to
about 60 cents in the peak week. Because the
differential is so small and search costs are high,
it is not surprising that the price asymmetry per-
sists longer than 16 weeks.
Since there is no evidence or theory sug-
gesting that asymmetry necessarily arises from
market power in the retail market, policies
aimed at eradicating asymmetry are likely to 
reduce efficiency. Even a simple policy of re-
quiring retail margins to remain constant over
time could have unintended consequences for
inventories and lead to shortages when prices
are rising. More complicated policies would 
be more difficult to administer. Again, the best 
policy seems to be to watch for mergers that
increase market concentration, rather than to
take direct steps to suppress the asymmetry.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of econometric studies confirm
casual observations that gasoline prices respond
asymmetrically to crude oil price movements 
by rising more quickly when crude oil prices 
are rising than falling when crude oil prices 
are falling. Although popular opinion seems to
attribute the asymmetry to market power,
Peltzman (2000) shows that price asymmetries
arise independently of market structure. In addi-
tion, no formal theory relating market power to
asymmetry has been tested (to our knowledge),
nor is there much evidence of concentration in
U.S. markets for gasoline. Consumer search costs
and locational advantages may provide market
power to some retailers, but such market power
might be viewed as the costs of product differ-
entiation under monopolistic competition.
With the evidence pointing away from
market power as an explanation, asymmetry is
likely to be the consequence of other market
factors. As such, policies to suppress asym-
metric price movements are likely to lead to un-
desirable outcomes. If one is concerned about
market power in the production, distribution,
and marketing of gasoline, the best policy
seems to be watching for mergers that increase
market concentration without increasing econo-
mies of scale, rather than taking direct steps 
to suppress asymmetry.
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helpful comments and suggestions while retaining
responsibility for any errors or omissions.
1 Previous research does not find this type of asym-
metry. Increased environmental regulation of refinery
operations and increased taxation of gasoline appear
to have been offset by productivity gains. See Boren-
stein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) and Balke, Brown,
and Yücel (1998).
2 For examples, see Ferguson (2000) and Ivanovich
(2000).
3 Peltzman (2000) finds that the fuel component of the
consumer price index responds asymmetrically to the
fuel component of the producer price index.
4 Pricing asymmetries have been observed in many
industries, including banking (Neumark and Sharpe
1992) and agriculture (Mohanty et al. 1995). Peltzman
(2000) finds pricing asymmetry exists in about two-
thirds of U.S. industry.
5 Variations of the kinked-demand model of oligopoly 
do not suggest an asymmetrical movement in the
output price of an industry in the response to common
shocks to the input prices of the firms in that industry.
The model explains why prices are less likely to
change in either direction. See Scherer (1980) and
Neumark and Sharpe (1992).
6 The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is a summary
measure of market concentration.
where Si is the market share of the ith firm. A monopo-
listic industry with one firm would have an HHI of
10,000 (where market shares are measured in percent-
age terms).
7 Given that retail margins are very small (see Deltas
1997 and BCG), a large increase in input prices could
quickly turn margins negative. Hence, retailers hasten
to pass on input price increases.
8 The low individual costs associated with limited market
power should not be taken as an argument that
asymmetry has little aggregate cost. We are simply
pointing out that the individual benefit–cost calcula-
tions made by rational individuals are likely to result in
a relatively slow search. When multiplied by the tens 
of millions of people who drive on a daily basis, the
aggregate costs of asymmetry are significant, but
these costs are presumably lower than the aggregate
search costs that would be necessary to eliminate
asymmetry.
9 Such policies might include government manipulation
of inventories or a requirement that oil companies,
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pricing for gasoline with constant markups over time.
To the extent that either policy interfered with free mar-
ket outcomes, implementation would reduce economic
efficiency. A policy of varying taxes inversely with oil
prices would be ineffective in eliminating asymmetry
because it would not produce additional gasoline
when prices are rising.
10 Six dollars per barrel is equal to the variance of oil
prices in the past 10 years.
REFERENCES
Bacon, Robert W. (1991), “Rockets and Feathers: The
Asymmetric Speed of Adjustment of UK Retail Gasoline
Prices to Cost Changes,” Energy Economics 13 (July):
211–18.
Balke, Nathan S., Stephen P. A. Brown, and Mine K. Yücel
(1998), “Crude Oil and Gasoline Prices: An Asymmetric
Relationship?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic
Review, First Quarter, 2–11.
Borenstein, Severin (1991), “Selling Costs and Switching
Costs: Explaining Retail Gasoline Margins,” Rand Journal
of Economics 22 (Autumn): 354–69.
Borenstein, Severin, A. Colin Cameron, and Richard
Gilbert (1997), “Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetri-
cally to Crude Oil Prices?” Quarterly Journal of Economics
112 (February): 305–39.
Borenstein, Severin, and Andrea Shepard (1993),
“Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,” NBER
Working Paper Series no. 4489 (Cambridge, Mass.:
National Bureau of Economic Research, October).
Deltas, George (1997), “Retail Gasoline Price Response
Asymmetries to Wholesale Price Shocks” (Paper pre-
sented at Western Economic Association Meeting,
Seattle, July).
Ferguson, Ellyn (2000), “House Seeking Answers on High
Gas Prices,” USA Today online, June 22. 
French, Mark (1991), “Asymmetry in Gasoline Price
Changes” (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, August, Draft paper).
Haltiwanger, John, and Joseph E. Harrington Jr. (1991),
“Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive
Behavior,” Rand Journal of Economics 22 (Spring):
89–106.
Ivanovich, David (2000), “Inquiry into Midwest Gasoline-
Price Surge Is Still Pending, Commission Says,” Houston
Chronicle online, July 30.
Karrenbock, Jeffrey D. (1991), “The Behavior of Retail
Gasoline Prices: Symmetric or Not?” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August, 19–29.
Mohanty, Samarendu, E. Peterson, F. Wesley, and Nancy
Cottrell Kruse (1995), “Price Asymmetry in the Inter-
national Wheat Market,” Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics 43 (November): 355–66.
Neumark, David, and Steven A. Sharpe (1992), “Market
Structure and the Nature of Price Rigidity: Evidence from
the Market for Consumer Deposits,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 107 (May): 657–80.
Norman, Donald A., and David Shin (1991), “Price
Adjustment in Gasoline and Heating Oil Markets,”
American Petroleum Institute Research Study no. 060
(Washington, D.C., August).
Peltzman, Sam (2000), “Prices Rise Faster Than They
Fall,” Journal of Political Economy 108 (June): 466–502.
Reagan, Patricia (1982), “Inventory and Price Behavior,”
Review of Economic Studies 49 (January): 137–42.
Reagan, Patricia, and Martin Weitzman (1982), “Asym-
metries in Price and Quantity Adjustments by the
Competitive Firm,” Journal of Economic Theory 27
(August): 410–20.
Scherer, F. M. (1980), Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally).
Shin, David (1992), “Do Product Prices Respond
Symmetrically to Changes in Crude Oil Prices,” American
Petroleum Institute Research Study no. 068 (Washington,
D.C., December).
Tirole, Jean (1990), The Theory of Industrial Organization
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
U.S. General Accounting Office (1993), “Analysis of 
the Pricing of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,”
GAO/RCED-91-17 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, March).